Identity Management, Federation & Kerberos
CISSP CISSP · Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Identity is the new perimeter
As organisations move to cloud services and remote work, the network perimeter has dissolved — and identity has become the primary security boundary. Domain 5's identity management content covers the full lifecycle of a digital identity: how identities are created, verified, used across systems, and eventually retired. The exam treats identity management as a governance discipline as much as a technical one: who is responsible for an identity, how is it proven, and how does trust extend across organisational boundaries?
The identity lifecycle
An identity goes through stages that mirror the employment lifecycle. Proofing (or identity vetting) establishes that a person is who they claim to be, before an account is created — checking government documents, verifying employment, or using knowledge-based checks. Provisioning creates the account and grants initial access based on the person's role. Maintenance covers changes: role changes, name changes, access adjustments. Deprovisioning removes the identity and its access when the person leaves. The exam's emphasis is on the ends of the lifecycle: weak proofing lets attackers create fraudulent identities, and failed deprovisioning leaves orphaned accounts that attackers can exploit. Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems automate this lifecycle, ideally integrated with HR so that a hiring or termination event triggers the corresponding identity action automatically. The exam also covers identity repositories — directories such as Active Directory or LDAP — and the concept of a single authoritative source for identity data, so that there is one place where an identity's status is definitively recorded.
Single sign-on (SSO)
Single sign-on lets a user authenticate once and access multiple systems without re-authenticating. It improves both security (fewer passwords to manage, centralised authentication policy, faster deprovisioning) and usability. The exam distinguishes SSO from password synchronisation (where the same password is pushed to multiple systems — simpler but weaker, because each system still authenticates independently and a compromise of one password store affects all) and from credential management systems. SSO has a central risk: the identity provider becomes a single point of failure and a high-value target — if the IdP is compromised, every connected system is at risk, which is why the IdP itself must be protected with MFA and strong monitoring. Session management is the related concern: SSO sessions must have appropriate timeouts, and logout must terminate the session everywhere (single logout), not just in one application.
Federation: SAML, OAuth and OpenID Connect
Federation extends SSO across organisational boundaries: a user authenticates with their home identity provider (IdP), and a service provider (SP) trusts the IdP's assertion about the user's identity. The trust relationship is established in advance through exchanged metadata and certificates. The three protocols the exam tests are distinct in purpose. SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is an XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorisation assertions between an IdP and an SP — the standard for enterprise SSO to web applications. OAuth 2.0 is an authorisation framework, not an authentication protocol: it lets a user grant a third-party application limited access to their resources (such as letting a calendar app read their email) without sharing their password, using access tokens with defined scopes. OpenID Connect (OIDC) is built on top of OAuth 2.0 and adds an identity layer: it provides authentication (proving who the user is) using ID tokens (JSON Web Tokens), and is the modern standard for "Sign in with Google" style logins. The exam's favourite confusion is OAuth versus OIDC: OAuth authorises access to resources; OIDC authenticates identity. If a question asks how to prove who a user is, the answer is OIDC (or SAML), not OAuth alone.
| Protocol | Purpose | Token / format |
|---|---|---|
| SAML 2.0 | Authentication and authorisation assertions (enterprise SSO) | XML assertions |
| OAuth 2.0 | Authorisation: delegated access to resources | Access tokens (opaque or JWT) |
| OpenID Connect | Authentication: identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0 | ID token (JWT) |
| Kerberos | Authentication within a trusted domain (e.g. Active Directory) | Tickets (TGT, service tickets) |
Kerberos
Kerberos is the authentication protocol used by Active Directory and the exam tests its mechanics in detail. It is based on symmetric-key cryptography and a trusted third party, the Key Distribution Center (KDC), which contains an Authentication Server (AS) and a Ticket Granting Service (TGS). The flow is: the user authenticates to the AS and receives a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT); the user presents the TGT to the TGS to request a service ticket for a specific resource; the user presents the service ticket to the resource to gain access. Tickets are time-limited and encrypted, and the protocol depends on synchronised clocks — if the clocks on the client, KDC and server differ by more than the tolerance (typically five minutes), authentication fails, which is why NTP is a security dependency, not just a convenience. Kerberos provides mutual authentication (both parties prove their identity) and single sign-on within a domain. Its main weakness is the KDC itself: it is a single point of failure and a high-value target (the "golden ticket" attack forges a TGT using the KDC's secret key, giving effectively unlimited access). The exam also notes that Kerberos does not handle authorisation — it proves identity; the resource decides what the identity may do.
Directory services and RADIUS/TACACS+
LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is the standard protocol for querying directory services such as Active Directory; LDAPS is the encrypted variant and should always be used instead of plain LDAP. For network device authentication, two protocols dominate: RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service), which combines authentication and authorisation into a single process and encrypts only the password in transit (using UDP), and TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus), which separates authentication, authorisation and accounting into distinct functions and encrypts the entire packet body (using TCP). The exam's distinction: TACACS+ is preferred for device administration because of its granular separation (you can authorise different command sets for different administrators) and full-packet encryption; RADIUS is more common for general network access such as Wi-Fi and VPN authentication. Diameter is the successor to RADIUS, designed for larger and more complex environments.
Identity proofing and assurance levels
Not all identities need the same level of assurance. NIST SP 800-63 defines Identity Assurance Levels (IAL1–IAL3) for how thoroughly an identity is proofed, Authenticator Assurance Levels (AAL1–AAL3) for how strong the authentication is, and Federation Assurance Levels (FAL1–FAL3) for how strong the federation assertion is. A social media account needs only IAL1 (self-asserted identity); a government benefits system needs IAL2 or IAL3 (in-person or supervised remote proofing with government documents). The exam tests the concept that assurance levels should match the risk: requiring IAL3 proofing for a low-risk service wastes effort, and accepting IAL1 for a high-risk service invites fraud. The exam also covers identity theft and account takeover as threats, and the controls that mitigate them: strong proofing, MFA, and monitoring for anomalous behaviour.
Exam mindset for identity and federation
Federation questions reward knowing which protocol does what: SAML for enterprise SSO assertions, OAuth for delegated authorisation, OIDC for authentication on top of OAuth, Kerberos for domain authentication with tickets. When a question describes a ticket-based flow with a KDC, it is Kerberos; when it describes an IdP asserting identity to an SP, it is federation; and when it asks for delegated access without sharing a password, it is OAuth.
Exam traps to watch for
- Using OAuth alone for authentication — OAuth is authorisation (delegated access); OpenID Connect adds the authentication layer.
- Confusing SAML and OIDC: SAML is XML-based enterprise SSO; OIDC is JSON/JWT-based and built on OAuth 2.0.
- Forgetting that Kerberos depends on synchronised clocks — a clock skew beyond the tolerance breaks authentication.
- Treating RADIUS and TACACS+ as interchangeable: TACACS+ separates AAA functions and encrypts the full packet; RADIUS combines them and encrypts only the password.
Practice questions
Test yourself on this guide. Answers are checked instantly, with a full explanation for each question.
Q1.A company wants employees to sign in once with their corporate credentials and then access multiple cloud applications without re-authenticating. The applications are hosted by different vendors. Which technology BEST achieves this?
Explanation: Federated SSO with SAML is designed for exactly this: the corporate IdP authenticates the user once and sends signed assertions to each cloud SP, which trusts the IdP. Password synchronisation copies the same password everywhere, which is weaker and does not provide true SSO. Kerberos works within a trusted domain (such as Active Directory), not across independent cloud vendors. RADIUS authenticates network access (Wi-Fi, VPN), not web applications.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand identity federation (SAML, SSO)
Q2.A user wants to let a third-party calendar application read their email to find meeting invitations, without giving the application their email password. Which protocol is designed for this?
Explanation: OAuth 2.0 is an authorisation framework for delegated access: the user authorises the calendar app to access specific resources (read email) via a scoped access token, and the app never sees the password. SAML exchanges authentication assertions between IdP and SP, which is a different problem. Kerberos is for domain authentication with tickets. OpenID Connect authenticates identity (proving who the user is) but does not by itself grant access to the user's email resources.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand identity federation (OAuth 2.0)
Q3.Users in an Active Directory domain suddenly cannot authenticate, although their passwords are correct. The help desk notices the domain controller’s clock is 30 minutes ahead of the clients. What is the MOST likely cause?
Explanation: Kerberos tickets are time-limited and the protocol requires synchronised clocks, typically within a five-minute tolerance; a 30-minute skew means tickets appear expired or not yet valid, so authentication fails. Passwords do not expire simultaneously for all users. LDAP corruption would produce different symptoms and would not be explained by the clock difference. RADIUS is not involved in Active Directory domain authentication.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand authentication protocols (Kerberos)
Q4.A network team needs to authenticate administrators accessing routers and switches, with different command authorisations for junior and senior administrators, and full encryption of the authentication traffic. Which protocol is the BEST fit?
Explanation: TACACS+ separates AAA into distinct functions, so authorisation (which commands each administrator may run) can be controlled independently of authentication, and it encrypts the entire packet body over TCP. RADIUS combines authentication and authorisation and encrypts only the password, so it cannot provide the granular command authorisation required. LDAP is a directory query protocol, not a device administration protocol. SAML is for web federation, not router administration.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand authentication protocols (RADIUS vs TACACS+)
Q5.An attacker steals a company’s identity provider credentials and issues SAML assertions for the CEO’s account to access the finance system. What does this attack demonstrate about federated SSO?
Explanation: Federation concentrates trust in the IdP: service providers accept its assertions without independently verifying the user, so a compromised IdP can impersonate any user at any connected service. This is a risk to manage (with MFA, monitoring and strong IdP protection), not a reason to abandon federation. SAML assertions can be forged if the IdP's signing key is compromised — that is precisely what happened. OAuth would not help, because the same trust concentration applies to any IdP.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand identity federation (trust, IdP risk)
Q6.A government agency is designing an online service for claiming welfare benefits. Applicants must prove their identity before creating an account. Which assurance approach is MOST appropriate?
Explanation: Benefits claims involve public money and high fraud risk, so the identity proofing must be strong: NIST IAL2/IAL3 requires verification of government-issued documents, in person or through supervised remote proofing. Self-asserted identity and email verification prove almost nothing about who the person is. Social login relies on a consumer IdP whose proofing is weak and which the agency does not control.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand identity proofing and assurance levels
Q7.In the Kerberos authentication flow, what is the purpose of the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)?
Explanation: The TGT is issued by the Authentication Server after the user authenticates; presenting it to the Ticket Granting Service lets the user obtain service tickets for specific resources without re-authenticating — this is what makes Kerberos a single sign-on protocol. A service ticket, not the TGT, grants access to a specific server. Kerberos tickets do not encrypt application traffic. Authorisation is decided by the resource, not by the ticket.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand authentication protocols (Kerberos flow)
Q8.An organisation is integrating its HR system with its IAM platform so that when HR records a termination, the employee’s accounts are disabled automatically within one hour. Which identity management concept does this BEST illustrate?
Explanation: Using HR as the authoritative source to trigger automatic deprovisioning is the standard control against orphaned accounts: access removal follows the employment event without relying on manual action. Identity proofing is about verifying who someone is at account creation, not about termination. Federation is about cross-organisational trust for authentication, not HR-driven lifecycle automation. SSO is about authentication convenience, not account removal.
Exam objective: CISSP Domain 5: Understand identity lifecycle management